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Secrecy Capacity Analysis Over κ–μ Fading
Channels: Theory and Applications
Nidhi Bhargav, Simon L. Cotton, Senior Member, IEEE, and David E. Simmons
Abstract— In this paper, we consider the transmission of
confidential information over a κ–μ fading channel in the
presence of an eavesdropper who also experiences κ–μ fading.
In particular, we obtain novel analytical solutions for the prob-
ability of strictly positive secrecy capacity (SPSC) and a lower
bound of secure outage probability (SOPL) for independent and
non-identically distributed channel coefficients without parame-
ter constraints. We also provide a closed-form expression for the
probability of SPSC when the μ parameter is assumed to take
positive integer values. Monte-Carlo simulations are performed to
verify the derived results. The versatility of the κ–μ fading model
means that the results presented in this paper can be used to
determine the probability of SPSC and SOPL for a large number
of other fading scenarios, such as Rayleigh, Rice (Nakagami-
n), Nakagami-m, One-Sided Gaussian, and mixtures of these
common fading models. In addition, due to the duality of the
analysis of secrecy capacity and co-channel interference (CCI),
the results presented here will have immediate applicability in
the analysis of outage probability in wireless systems affected by
CCI and background noise (BN). To demonstrate the efficacy
of the novel formulations proposed here, we use the derived
equations to provide a useful insight into the probability of
SPSC and SOPL for a range of emerging wireless applications,
such as cellular device-to-device, peer-to-peer, vehicle-to-vehicle,
and body centric communications using data obtained from real
channel measurements.
Index Terms— Body centric communications, co-channel
interference, device-to-device communications, fading channels,
κ − μ fading, secrecy capacity, vehicular communications.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the proliferation of smart devices, driven byapplications such as the internet of things (IoT) [1],
device-to-device communications (D2D) [2] and wearable
sensors [3]–[5], privacy and security in wireless networking
systems have once again been brought to the forefront. The
wireless medium utilized by each of these applications has an
inherent broadcast nature that makes it particularly susceptible
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to eavesdropping. Traditionally, these systems have attained
secure communications by employing classical cryptographic
techniques; e.g., RSA or AES [6]. Unfortunately, these algo-
rithms are entirely disjoint from the physical nature of the
wireless medium as they assume that the physical layer
provides an error-free link. More recently, there has been
growing interest in information-theoretic security that exploits
the random nature of the wireless channel to guarantee the
confidential transmission of messages [7]. It is widely believed
that using this type of approach will provide the strictest form
of security for physical layer communications [8].
The notion of perfect information-theoretic secrecy, i.e.
I (M; C) = 0, where I (·; ·) denotes mutual information, M is
the plane text message and C is its corresponding encryption,
was first presented by Shannon [9]. These ideas were later
developed by Wyner [10], in which he introduced the wiretap
channel. Under the assumption that the wiretapper’s channel
is a probabilistically degraded version of the main channel,
he studied the trade-off between the information rate and the
achievable secrecy level for a wiretap channel and showed
that it is possible to achieve a non-zero secrecy capacity. The
secrecy capacity is defined as the largest transmission rate
from the source to the destination, at which the eavesdropper is
unable to obtain any information. Csiszár and Körner [11] later
extended Wyner’s work to non-degraded channels. Further
developments were made in [12], where it was shown that it is
possible to achieve secure communication in the presence of an
eavesdropper over an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
channel provided the channel capacity of the legitimate user
was greater than the eavesdropper’s. The secrecy capacity was
then shown to be equal to the difference between the two
channel capacities.
The effect of fading on secrecy capacity was studied
in [13]–[25]. Li et al. [13], Liang et al. [14] and
Gopala et al. [15] characterized the secrecy capacity of ergodic
fading channels and presented power and rate allocation
schemes for secure communication. In [16] and [17], the
secrecy capacity for multiple access and broadcast channels
was considered. Barros and Rodrigues [18] showed that with
signal fluctuation due to fading, information-theoretic security
is achievable even when the eavesdropper’s channel is of
better average quality than that of the intended recipient. They
analyzed the SOP and the outage secrecy capacity for Rayleigh
fading channels when both the transmitter and the receiver are
equipped with a single antenna in the presence of a solitary
eavesdropping party. A similar analysis for a system consisting
of a single antenna at the transmitter and multiple antennas
0090-6778 © 2016 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only. Personal use is also permitted,
but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
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at the receiver was presented in [19]. This was extended to
multiple eavesdropping parties in [20] and over Nakagami-m
fading channels in [21] and [22]. It was found that the SOP
increases with the number of eavesdroppers and the average
SNR of the eavesdropper. The outage secrecy capacity was
found to increase with the Nakagami-m parameter, since
an increase in m decreases the severity of fading in the
channel. More recently, the secrecy characteristics of other
commonly encountered fading models such as lognormal,
Weibull and Rice have also been studied. For example,
the probability of SPSC of lognormal fading channels was
studied in [23], while the probability of SPSC and SOPL of
Weibull fading channels was investigated in [24]. In [25] a
secrecy capacity analysis over Rice/Rice fading channels was
conducted and the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity
was determined.
While a number of important performance measures for
κ-μ fading channels [26] have previously been developed such
as energy detection based spectrum sensing [27]–[29] and
outage probability analysis in interference-limited scenarios
with restricted values of μ [29], to the best of the authors’
knowledge the secrecy capacity of κ-μ fading channels has yet
to be reported in the open literature. Due to the equivalency
pointed out in [30], the results presented here will also have
immediate applicability in the analysis of outage probability in
cellular systems affected by co-channel interference (CCI) and
background noise (BN), and the calculation of outage probabil-
ity in interference-limited scenarios. Indeed the new equations
proposed here provide an alternative, more general result than
those presented in [29] (wherein the outage probability in
interference-limited scenarios is restricted to particular values
of the μ parameter) and allow the calculation of the relevant
capacity formulations for arbitrary, real, positive values of
the μ parameter. Motivated by this, we analyze the secrecy
capacity of κ-μ fading channels in which we assume the
eavesdropper to be passive and the channel state information
(CSI) of the eavesdropper and the intended recipient are not
available at the transmitter.
The main contributions of this paper are now listed as
follows. Firstly, we derive novel analytical expressions for
the probability of SPSC and SOPL over i.n.i.d. κ-μ fading
channels without any constraints on the channel parameters.
Secondly, we provide an exact closed-form solution for the
probability of SPSC over κ-μ fading channels when μ takes
positive integer values. These expressions have been sub-
sequently verified by reduction to known special cases
and Monte-Carlo simulations. Thirdly and most importantly,
because the κ-μ fading model [26] contains a number of
other well-known fading models as special cases, the novel
formulations presented in this paper unify the secrecy capacity
of Rayleigh, Rice (Nakagami-n), Nakagami-m and One-Sided
Gaussian fading channels, and their mixtures. Therefore they
can be used to provide a useful insight into the secrecy
capacity of eavesdropping scenarios which undergo general-
ized fading conditions. Fourthly, due to the known duality
between the analysis of interference and eavesdropping [30],
the utility of the results presented here extend well beyond
their intended area of use. Put more precisely, they can also
be used to analyze the outage probability in systems with
CCI and BN, and the calculation of outage probability in
interference-limited scenarios for κ-μ/κ-μ1 fading channels.
Finally, we provide important applications of these new
results to estimate the probability of SPSC and SOPL of
a number of emerging wireless applications such as cellu-
lar device-to-device, peer-to-peer, vehicle-to-vehicle and body
centric communications using data obtained from real channel
measurements.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II provides a brief overview of the κ-μ fading model.
Section III explains the system model while Section IV
provides the derivation of novel analytical and closed form
expressions for the probability of SPSC and SOPL . Section V
discusses the secrecy capacity of the common fading models
derived from the κ-μ fading model; this is followed by
some numerical results. Section VI discusses some of the
applications of this paper. Lastly, Section VII finishes the paper
with some concluding remarks.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE κ -μ FADING MODEL
The κ-μ fading model was originally conceived for
modeling the small-scale variations of a fading signal under
line-of-sight (LOS) conditions in homogeneous scattering
environments [26]. The κ-μ fading signal is a composition of
clusters of multipath waves with scattered waves of identical
power with a dominant component of arbitrary power found
within each cluster. Its received signal envelope, R, may be
expressed in terms of the in-phase and quadrature components
of the fading signal such that [26, eq. (6)]
R2 =
μ∑
i=1
(Xi + pi)2 +
μ∑
i=1
(Yi + qi )2 (1)
where μ is the number of multipath clusters, Xi and Yi are
mutually independent Gaussian random processes with mean
E[Xi ] = E[Yi ] = 0 and variance E
[
Xi 2
] = E [Yi 2
] = σ 2
(i.e., the power of the scattered waves in each of the clusters).
Here pi and qi are the mean values of the in-phase and
quadrature phase components of multipath cluster i and
d2 =
μ∑
i=1
pi 2 + qi 2. Letting γ represent the instantaneous
signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) of a κ-μ fading channel, then its
probability density function (PDF), fγ (γ ), is obtained from
the envelope PDF given in [26, eq. (11)] via a transformation
of variables
(
r = √γ rˆ2/γ¯
)
as
fγ (γ ) = μ(1 + κ)
μ+1
2 γ
μ−1
2 e
−μ(1+κ)γ
γ¯
κ
μ−1
2 γ¯
μ+1
2 eμκ
Iμ−1
(
2μ
√
κ (1 + κ) γ
γ¯
)
(2)
1Herein, it should be noted that we adopt the notation M/E to describe
the fading conditions experienced by the main channel (M), and the
eavesdropper (E). E.g. κ-μ/κ-μ indicates that the main and eavesdropper’s
channels are both subject to i.n.i.d. κ-μ fading. Due to the generality of the
κ-μ fading model, M and E can be readily interchanged with the Rayleigh,
Nakagami-m, Rice and One-sided Gaussian models which all appear as special
cases of this fading model.
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Fig. 1. The proposed system model.
where κ > 0 is the ratio of the total power of the dom-
inant components (d2) to the total power of the scattered
waves (2μσ 2), μ > 0 is related to the number of multipath
clusters and is given by μ = E2(γ )(1+2κ)
V(γ )(1+κ)2 where E(·) and V(·)
denote the expectation and variance operators, respectively,
γ¯ = E (γ ), is the average SNR and In(·) is the modified
Bessel function of the first kind and order n. As indicated
in [26], it should be noted that the μ parameter can take non-
integer values which can be due to the non-zero correlation
between the in-phase and quadrature components of each
cluster, non-zero correlation between the multipath clusters or
non-Gaussian nature of the in-phase and quadrature compo-
nents. The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of γ can
be obtained from [26, eq. (3)] as
Fγ (γ ) = 1 − Qμ
[
√
2κμ,
√
2 (1 + κ) μγ
γ¯
]
(3)
where Q· (·, ·) is the generalized Marcum Q-function defined
in [31, eq. (4.60)] as
QM (α, β) = 1
αM−1
∫ ∞
β
x M e
−
(
x2+α2
2
)
IM−1 (αx) dx . (4)
The κ-μ distribution is a generalized fading model which
contains as special cases important distributions such as the
Rice (μ = 1; κ = K ), Nakagami-m (κ → 0; μ =
m), Rayleigh (μ = 1; κ → 0) and One-Sided Gaussian
(μ = 0.5; κ → 0).
III. THE SYSTEM MODEL
Consider the system model of secure data transmission
shown in Fig. 1. The legitimate transmitter, Alice (node A),
wishes to communicate secretly with the legitimate receiver,
Bob (node B), while a third party, Eve (node E), is attempting
to eavesdrop. We assume that the main and eavesdropper’s
channels both experience κ-μ fading. Alice wishes to send
a message, wk = [w(1),w(2) . . . w(k)] to Bob. At the
transmitter, the message wk is encoded into a codeword,
xn = [x(1), x(2) . . . x(n)], for transmission over the channel.
The signal received by Bob and Eve can be written as
yM (i) = hM (i) x (i) + nM (i) (5)
yE (i) = hE (i) x (i) + nE (i) (6)
where hM (i) and hE (i) are the quasi-static κ-μ fading
coefficients of the main and the eavesdropper’s channels,
respectively (i.e., hM (i) = hM∀i and hE (i) = hE∀i ) and
nM (i) and nE (i) are the zero-mean circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian noise random variables with unit variance
at Bob and Eve, respectively.
We assume that the fading coefficients of Bob and Eve’s
channels, although random, are constant during the transmis-
sion of an entire codeword and independent of each other.
Letting P , NM and NE represent the average transmit power,
noise power in the main channel, and noise power in the
eavesdropper’s channel respectively, then, the corresponding
instantaneous SNR’s at Bob and Eve are given by, γM =
P|hM |2
NM and γE =
P|hE |2
NE , while the average SNR’s are given
by, γ¯M = PE(|hM |2)NM and γ¯E =
PE(|hE |2)
NE . Now let us consider
the channel components of Bob and Eve which are assumed
to be i.n.i.d. random variables with parameters {κM , μM , γ¯M }
and {κE , μE , γ¯E }, respectively. The PDF’s of γM and γE can
be re-written from (2) as
fγM (γM ) =
μM (1 + κM )
μM +1
2 γM
μM −1
2 e
−μM (1+κM )γM
γ¯M
κM
μM −1
2 γ¯
μM +1
2
M e
μMκM
× IμM −1
(
2μM
√
κM (1 + κM ) γM
γ¯M
)
(7)
fγE (γE ) =
μE (1 + κE )
μE +1
2 γE
μE −1
2 e
−μE (1+κE )γE
γ¯E
κE
μE −1
2 γ¯
μE +1
2
E e
μEκE
× IμE −1
(
2μE
√
κE (1 + κE ) γE
γ¯E
)
. (8)
Also, from (3) the CDF’s of γM and γE can be written as
FγM (γM ) = 1 − QμM
[
√
2κMμM ,
√
2 (1 + κM )μMγM
γ¯M
]
(9)
FγE (γE ) = 1 − QμE
[
√
2κEμE ,
√
2 (1 + κE ) μEγE
γ¯E
]
.
(10)
IV. SECRECY CAPACITY IN κ -μ FADING CHANNELS
Here, we derive an analytical expression for the SOPL .
We also arrive at both an analytical and closed form expres-
sion for the probability of SPSC over κ-μ fading channels.
In passive eavesdropping scenarios, where the CSI of the
eavesdropper and the intended recipient are not available at the
transmitter, perfect secrecy is not guaranteed. Hence, we are
interested in calculating physical layer security metrics such
as the probability of SPSC and SOP. For the system under
consideration, the capacity of the main and the eavesdropper’s
channels are given by CM = log2 (1 + γM ) and CE =
log2 (1 + γE ), respectively. From [8], we define the secrecy
capacity, CS , for one realization of the SNR pair (γM , γE ) of
the quasi-static complex fading wiretap channel as
CS =
{
log2 (1 + γM ) − log2 (1 + γE ) (γM > γE )
0, (γM ≤ γE ) (11)
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A. SOP Analysis
The secrecy outage probability is the probability that the
instantaneous secrecy capacity falls below a target secrecy rate
RS (RS ≥ 0) and is defined in [8] as
Pout (RS) = P (CS ≤ RS) . (12)
We now express RS in terms of the threshold SNR, γth ,
related by RS = log2 (1 + γth) . Performing the necessary
mathematical manipulations, we obtain
Pout (γth) = P
[
γM ≤ (1 + γth) (1 + γE ) − 1
] (13)
which can then be expressed as
Pout (γth)
= μE (1 + κE )
μE +1
2
κE
μE −1
2 γ E
μE +1
2 eμEκE
∫ ∞
0
γE
μE −1
2
× e
−μE (1+κE )γE
γ E IμE −1
(
2μE
√
κE (1 + κE ) γE
γ E
)
×
(
1 − QμM
(
√
2κMμM ,
√
2 (1 + κM ) (γth + γthγE + γE )μM
γ M
))
dγE . (14)
Proof: See Appendix A.
At present, due to the complicated form of the integral
contained in (14) it is not possible to obtain a closed-form
expression for the SOP, therefore, we derive the lower bound
of SOP as follows [24]
Pout (γth) = P
[
γM ≤ (1 + γth) (1 + γE ) − 1
]
≥ SOPL (γth) = P
[
γM ≤ (1 + γth)γE
]
. (15)
Now, using (8), (9) and (15) the lower bound of SOP is
SOPL (γth) = μE (1 + κE )
μE +1
2
κE
μE −1
2 γ E
μE +1
2 eμEκE
∞∫
0
γE
μE −1
2 e
−μE (1+κE )γE
γ E
× IμE −1
(
2μE
√
κE (1 + κE ) γE
γ E
)
×
(
1 − QμM
(
√
2κMμM ,
√
2 (1 + κM ) (1 + γth)γEμM
γ M
))
dγE .
(16)
The solution for (16) can be obtained via the following
proposition.
Fig. 2. (a) Comparison between the SOP and SO P L . Lines represent (17)
and markers represent simulation results for the SOP with γth = 1.5 dB.
(b) Error of the lower bound versus γ¯M . In both figures κM = 5, κE = 1.5;
μM = μE = 2.
Proposition 1: For the arbitrary real and positive μM , μE ,
κM and κE (16) can be evaluated as
SOPL (γth) = 1 − βE
μE
eαE+αM
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=0
(αEβE )
kαM l
k! l! d β (c, d)
× (βM (1 + γth))
c
(βM (1 + γth) + βE )c+d
× 2 F1
(
1, c + d; d + 1; βE
βM (1 + γth) + βE
)
(17)
where a = 1/γ¯M , b = 1/γ¯E , c = μM + l, d = μE + k,
βM = (1 + κM )aμM , βE = (1 + κE )bμE, αM = κMμM ,
αE = κEμE , β(c, d) = (c)(d)(c+d) is the Beta function and
2 F1(· , · ; · ; ·) is the Gauss hypergeometric function [32].
Proof: See Appendix B.
Interestingly, by observing the second argument of Q· (·, ·)
in (14) and (16), we see that, as γ¯M grows large, the error
of the lower bound will go to zero. Similarly, from (11) the
same applies as γ¯E grows large. To demonstrate this, we plot
Figs. 2 (a) and (b). Fig. 2 (a) shows plots of Pout (γth) and
SO P L as functions of γ¯M for a range of γ¯E ; while Fig. 2 (b)
shows plots of the error between these two functions, again,
as a function of γ¯M for a range of γ¯E .
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B. SPSC Analysis
In this subsection we examine the condition for the exis-
tence of strictly positive secrecy capacity. This occurs as a
special case of the secrecy outage probability when the target
secrecy rate, RS = 0. According to [8] the probability of non-
zero secrecy capacity is defined as
P0 = P (CS > 0) = P (γM > γE ) . (18)
In terms of the secrecy outage probability P0 is expressed as
P0 = 1 − Pout (0) (19)
Substituting γth = 0 in (14) and then using it in (19) the
integral form of the probability of SPSC can be expressed as
P0 = μE (1 + κE )
μE +1
2
κE
μE −1
2 γ E
μE +1
2 eμE κE
∞∫
0
γE
μE −1
2 e
−μE (1+κE )γE
γ E
× IμE −1
(
2μE
√
κE (1 + κE ) γE
γ E
)
× QμM
(
√
2κMμM ,
√
2 (1 + κM ) μMγE
γ M
)
dγE . (20)
The solution for (20) depends on the parameters μM and μE
and is obtained via the following propositions.
Proposition 2: For the arbitrary real and positive
μM and μE , (20) is evaluated by substituting γth = 0 in (17)
and then using the obtained result in (19) as
P0 = βE
μE
eαE+αM
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=0
(αEβE )
kαM l(βM )
c
k! l! d β (c, d)(βM + βE )c+d
× 2 F1
(
1, c + d; d + 1; βE
βM + βE
)
(21)
where a = 1/γ¯M, b = 1/γ¯E , c = μM + l, d = μE + k,
βM = (1 + κM )aμM, βE = (1 + κE )bμE , αM = κMμM ,
αE = κEμE , β(c, d) = (c)(d)(c+d) is the Beta function and
2 F1(· , · ; · ; ·) is the Gauss hypergeometric function [32].
Proposition 3: For integer values of μM and μE , an exact
closed form solution for (20) is obtained as
P0
= 1 − P´ + exp
(
− A
2r + B2r−1
2R
) v∑
m=−μ
(
A
Br
)m
Im
(
AB
R
)
×
⎧
⎨
⎩
μ∑
k=1
(
v + k
k + m
)
r v−k+1 R−v−k−1 −
v∑
j=1
( j
m
)
r j−1 R− j−1
⎫
⎬
⎭
(22)
where
P´ = Q1
⎛
⎝
√
A2 A´
B´ + A´ ,
√
B2 B´
B´ + A´
⎞
⎠ −
(
B´
B´ + A´
)
× exp
(
− A
2 A´ + B2 B´
2B´ + 2 A´
)
I0
(√
A2 B2 A´B´
B´ + A´
)
;
r =
√
(1+κM )μM a
(1+κE )μE b ; A =
√
2κEμE ; B = √2κMμM ; A´ =
(1 + κM ) μM a; B´ = (1 + κE ) μE b; μ = μE −1; v = μM −1;
a = 1γ¯M ; b = 1γ¯E and R = r + r−1.
Proof: See Appendix C.
V. SPECIAL CASES AND NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we verify the novel analytical and closed-
form expressions of the SO P L and probability of SPSC
derived above by first reducing the formulations to a number of
known special cases and then, for the general case, performing
Monte-Carlo simulations. We also use the formulations to
provide a useful insight into the behavior of the SOPL and
SPSC as a function of the fading parameters of the legitimate
and eavesdroppers channels.
A. Some Special Cases
As discussed previously, because of the generality of the
κ-μ fading model the results presented here encompass the
probability of SPSC and SOPL for a wide range of fading
channels.
1) Rice/Rice and Rayleigh/Rayleigh: To obtain the proba-
bility of SPSC for the case when both the main channel and
eavesdropper’s channel undergo Rician fading (i.e. a Rice/Rice
fading scenario), we substitute μM = μE = 1 into (21)
and/or (22) in which case these reduce to
P0 = (1 + κE ) b
eκE+κM
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=0
(κE (1 + κE ) b)k
k! (1 + k)
× (κM )
l
l! (1 + l)
((1 + κM )a)1+l  (2 + k + l)
(1 + k) ((1 + κM ) a + (1 + κE ) b)2+k+l
× 2 F1
(
1, 2 + k + l; 2 + k; (1 + κE ) b
(1 + κM ) a + (1 + κE ) b
)
(23)
and
P0 = 1 − Q1
(√
2κE a (1 + κM )
b (1 + κE ) + a (1 + κM ) ,
√
2κM b (1 + κE )
b (1 + κE ) + a (1 + κM )
)
+
(
b (1 + κE )
b (1 + κE ) + a (1 + κM )
)
e
(
− akE (1+κM )+bκM (1+κE )b(1+κE )+a(1+κM )
)
× I0
(
2
√
abκMκE (1 + κE ) (1 + κM )
b (1 + κE ) + a (1 + κM )
)
(24)
which are in exact agreement with the result reported
in [25, eq. (10)] and are illustrated visually in Fig. 3(a).
Of course letting κM = κE = 0, then
P0 = γ M
γ M + γ E
(25)
which matches exactly with that given in [18, eq. (5)] for a
Rayleigh/Rayleigh fading scenario.
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Fig. 3. (a) The probability of SPSC versus γ¯M . Triangle markers repre-
sent [25, eq. (10)] with κa = 15, κb = 12 for Rice; circle markers [21, eq. (8)]
with m = 2; N = 1 for Nakagami-m and square markers [18, eq. (5)] for
Rayleigh fading. (b) SO P L versus γ¯M with γth = 1 dB. Lines represent
(21)/(22) in (a) and (17) in (b) for the special case of Rice (μM = μE = 1;
κM = 15, κE = 12); Nakagami-m (κM = κE → 0; μM = μE = 2)
and Rayleigh fading (κM = κE → 0; μM = μE = 1). Plus sign markers
represent simulation results.
In a similar manner, substituting μM = μE = 1 in (17), we
obtain the SO P L for a Rice/Rice fading scenario as
SOPL (γth)
= 1 − (1 + κE ) b
eκE+κM
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=0
(κE (1 + κE ) b)kκM l
k!l! (1 + k)  (1 + l)
× ((1 + γth) (1 + κM ) a)
1+l  (2 + k + l)
(1 + k) ((1 + γth) (1 + κM ) a + (1 + κE ) b)2+k+l
× 2 F1
(
1, 2 + k + l; 2 + k;
(1 + κE ) b
(1 + γth) (1 + κM ) a + (1 + κE ) b
)
(26)
It should be noted that the SO P or SO P L for the case
when both the main and the eavesdropper’s channel undergo
Rician fading has not been derived previously in the open
literature. Of course letting κM → 0 and κE → 0 in (26), we
obtain the SO P L for a Rayleigh/Rayleigh fading scenario.
The results presented here are in exact agreement with the
simulated results and are visually illustrated in Fig. 3(b).
2) Nakagami-m/Nakagami-m: By letting κM → 0 and
κE → 0 into (21) and/or (22), we obtain the probability
Fig. 4. (a) The probability of SPSC versus γ¯M and (b) The lower bound
of secrecy outage probability versus γ¯M with γth = 1 dB. Both figures
are obtained for the special case of κ-μ/One-Sided Gaussian (κM = 4.5;
μM = 2; κE → 0; μE = 0.5), Rice/Nakagami-m (κM = 5; μM = 1;
κE → 0; μE = 1.2) and κ-μ/Rice (κM = 2.4; μM = 3; κE = 4; μE = 1).
Lines represent analytical results and markers represent simulations.
of SPSC for the scenario where both the legitimate and
non-legitimate users channels undergo Nakagami-m fading.
As shown in Fig. 3(a), our results have been compared
with that reported in [21, eq. (8)]. It should be noted that
the expression proposed in [21, eq. (8)] is valid only for
identical fading parameters of the main and the eavesdroppers
channels and for integer values of the shape parameter, m
(or equivalently μ when κ → 0) when a single eavesdropper is
considered whereas the equation proposed here is valid for any
positive real value of the μ parameter. As shown in Fig. 3(a),
for the case of integer μM and μE , the results presented here
are in exact agreement with those presented in [21]. Similarly,
letting κM → 0 and κE → 0 in (17), we obtain the SO P L for
a Nakagami-m/Nakagami-m fading scenario. Fig. 3(b) shows
the lower bound of the secrecy outage probability versus γ¯M .
It is seen that the numerical results are in exact agreement
with the simulated ones.
3) Other Fading Scenarios: In a similar manner, the
probability of SPSC and SO P L for several different fad-
ing combinations, most of which have not previously been
reported in the open literature, can be obtained through appro-
priate substitutions in (21), (22) and (17). Figs. 4 (a) and (b)
show the shape of probability of SPSC and SO P L for a selec-
tion of these scenarios, namely the κ-μ/One-Sided Gaussian,
Rice/Nakagami-m and κ-μ/Rice.
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Fig. 5. (a) The probability of SPSC versus γ¯M and (b) The lower bound
of secrecy outage probability versus γ¯M for γth = 1.5 dB. In both figures,
κE = 1.5, μM = 2 and μE = 2. Lines represent analytical results and
markers represent simulations.
B. Numerical Results
Here, we discuss the behavior of P0 and SOPL as a function
of the parameters {κM , μM , γ¯M } and {κE , μE , γ¯E }. The
results presented here have been verified through Monte-Carlo
simulations. Two example profiles for the probability of SPSC
and SOPL are illustrated in Figs. 5 (a) and (b) with γth = 0
and 1.5 dB, respectively. These figures have been obtained
when κE = 1.5 and μM = μE = 2.
From Figs. 5 (a) and (b), we observe that for a fixed γ¯E the
probability of SPSC increases and the secrecy outage proba-
bility decreases as γ¯M increases. Since γ¯M indicates the signal
quality of the main channel, it is expected that improving
this will lead to P0 being larger and SO P L being smaller.
From Fig. 5(a), we observe that the probability of SPSC is
non-zero even when γ¯M < γ¯E . Furthermore, P0 increases
as κM , the main channel’s fading parameter, increases for
fixed κE . From Fig. 5(b), we observe that for a fixed γ¯M , the
SO P L decreases as γ¯E decreases. Additionally, we see that
the SO P L is negligibly affected by the main channels fading
parameters for low values of γ¯M . Furthermore, for fixed κE ,
the SO P L decreases as κM increases. Similar observations are
made when κM , κE and μE are set and μM is varied.
VI. APPLICATIONS OF SPSC AND SO P L FOR DEVICES
OPERATING IN κ -μ FADING CHANNELS
To illustrate the utility of the new equations proposed
here, we now analyze the probability of SPSC and SO P L
for a number of emerging applications such as cellular
device-to-device, body area network (BAN), peer-to-
peer (P2P) and vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications
using channel data obtained from field trials. For all of
the measurements conducted in this study, we considered
a three node system which consisted of Alice which acted
as the transmitter and also Bob and Eve which acted as the
receivers. Each of the nodes: A, B and E, consisted of an
ML5805 transceiver, manufactured by RFMD. The transceiver
boards were interfaced with a PIC32MX which acted as a
baseband controller and allowed the analog received signal
strength (RSS) to be sampled with a 10-bit quantization
depth. For all of the experiments conducted here, node A
was configured to output a continuous wave signal with a
power level of +17.6 dBm at 5.8 GHz while nodes B and E
sampled the channel at a rate of 1 kHz. The antennas used by
the transmitter and the receivers were +2.3 dBi sleeve dipole
antennas (Mobile Mark model PSKN3-24/55S).
A. Device-to-Device Scenario
The first set of measurements considered cellular device-
to-device communications channels operating at 5.8 GHz in
an indoor environment located on the first floor of the ECIT
building at Queen’s University Belfast in the United Kingdom.
The building mainly consists of metal studded dry walls with
metal tiled floors covered with polypropylene-fiber, rubber
backed carpet tiles, a metal ceiling with mineral fiber tiles
and recessed louvered luminaries suspended 2.7 m above floor
level. The D2D experiments were conducted in a large seminar
room with dimensions of 7.92 m × 12.58 m × 2.75 m
and contained a number of chairs, some desks constructed
from medium density fiberboard, a projector and a white
board. For these measurements, the antennas were housed
in a compact acrylonitrile butadiene styrene (ABS) enclosure
(107 × 55 × 20 mm). This setup was representative of the
form factor of a smart phone which allowed the user to hold
the device as they normally would to make a voice call. Each
antenna was securely fixed to the inside of the enclosure using
a small strip of Velcro®. The antennas were connected using
low-loss coaxial cables to nodes A, B and E.
The experiment was performed when the room was unoccu-
pied except for the test subjects holding the devices. As shown
in Fig. 6(a), this particular scenario considered three persons
carrying nodes A, B and E who were positioned at
points X, Y and Z respectively. The three test subjects using
nodes A, B and E were adult males of height 1.72 m, 1.84 m
and 1.83 m; mass 80 kg, 92 kg and 74 kg, respectively.
During the measurement trial, all three persons were initially
stationary and had the hypothetical user equipment (UE)
positioned at their heads. The persons at points Y and Z were
then instructed to move around randomly within a circle of
radius 0.5 m from their starting points while imitating a voice
call. A total of 74763 samples of the received signal power
were obtained and used for parameter estimation.
Figs. 7(a) and (b) show the empirical PDF of the sig-
nal envelope for Bob and Eve compared to the κ-μ PDF
given in [26, eq. (11)] for the D2D channel measurements.
All parameter estimates for the κ-μ fading model were
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TABLE I
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR THE κ − μ FADING MODEL OBTAINED FROM THE FIELD MEASUREMENTS
Fig. 6. Seminar room environment showing the position of nodes A, B and E
for (a) D2D scenario and (b) on-body scenario, while (c) shows the open office
environment with position of nodes A, B and E for P2P scenario. P indicates
the locations at which people remained seated.
obtained using the lsqnonlin function available in the opti-
mization toolbox of Matlab along with the κ-μ PDF given in
[26, eq. (11)]. To compute the estimates, a set of lower and
upper bounds for the κ - μ parameters are first defined,2
and then some initial starting points for the parameters are
chosen randomly and input into the Matlab function. The
Matlab function then uses the Trust-Region-Reflective least
squares algorithm [33], [34] to obtain the optimal points.
This algorithm minimises a function f (x) by approximating
f with a simpler function q , that is given by the first two
terms of the Taylor approximation to f at x . Optimization is
then performed with respect to q within some neighbourhood
N of x . Let x´ be the point obtained from this optimization
procedure. If f (x´) < f (x), the current point x is updated to x´
2For the parameter estimation process undertaken here, the κ and μ
parameters were bounded according to the conditions: 0 ≤ κ ≤ 100 and
0.01 ≤ μ ≤ 5.
otherwise the point remains unchanged and the neighbourhood
about x is shrunk. This is repeated until the optimal points are
found. It should be noted that to remove the impact of any
shadowing processes, which are not accounted for in the κ-μ
fading model, the data sets were normalized to their respective
local means prior to parameter estimation. To determine the
window size for extraction of the local mean signal, the
raw data was visually inspected and overlaid with the local
mean signal for differing window sizes. For the D2D channel
data, a smoothing window of 500 samples was used. As we
can quite clearly see, from Figs. 7(a) and (b), the envelope
PDF of the κ-μ fading model provides an excellent fit to
the D2D data. To allow the reader to reproduce these plots,
parameter estimates for all four measurement scenarios are
given in Table I.
Using the parameter estimates obtained from the field trials,
Figs. 7(c) and (d) depict the estimated probability of SPSC and
SO P L versus γ¯E for selected values of γ¯M for the measured
D2D channel, respectively. In this instance, it can be seen that
the estimates for κ of the main and eavesdropper’s channels
are comparable and also greater than 0, suggesting that a
dominant component existed for both. We also observe that
the parameter estimates for μM and μE are both quite close
to 1, suggesting that a single multipath cluster contributes to
the signal received by both node B and node E and thus this
fading scenario is quite close to the Rician case.
Throughout the remainder of this paper, we adopt the
following approach to analyse the secrecy metrics discussed
in section IV. For all of the SPSC measurement scenarios, we
perform our analysis when γ¯M is fixed at 10 dB and for two
different levels of P0: 0.25 (25% SPSC level) and 0.5 (50%
SPSC level), which are indicative of a relatively low and mid-
range level of SPSC, respectively. Equivalently, for the secrecy
outage probability performance metric, our analysis is carried
out when γ¯M is fixed at 10 dB and for two different levels
of SO P L : 0.75 (75% SO P L level) and 0.5 (50% SO P L
level), which are representative of relatively high and mid-
range levels of SO P L . The SO P L levels of 75% and 50%
are equivalent to a secrecy reliability level3 of 25% and 50%,
respectively.
First, considering γ¯M = 10 dB in Fig. 7(c), we observe
that if the eavesdropper can improve her average SNR from
5 dB to 10 dB, the probability of SPSC will decrease
from 78% to 50%. Furthermore, to ensure an SPSC level
of at least 25%, we find that the eavesdropper’s average
SNR must not exceed 14.4 dB. Likewise, to ensure an
SPSC level of at least 50%, γ¯E must not exceed 10 dB.
3Here we define the secrecy reliability probability as 1 − SO P L .
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Fig. 7. Empirical envelope PDF of (a) node B and (b) node E compared to the κ-μ PDF given in [26, eq. (11)] while (c) and (d) show the probability of
SPSC and SO P L (γth = 1.5 dB) versus γ¯E with selected values of γ¯M for D2D channel measurements, respectively.
Next, consulting Fig. 7(d) with γ¯M again equal to 10 dB,
we find that an increase in the eavesdropper’s average SNR
from 5 dB to 10 dB causes the integrity of the channel
between Alice and Bob to become increasingly compromised.
This is evidenced by the increase in the secrecy outage
probability which rises from 43% to 72%. For this fading
environment, to ensure a secrecy reliability level of at least
25% or 50%, the eavesdropper’s average SNR must not exceed
10.5 dB and 6.2 dB, respectively.
B. Body Area Network Scenario
The second set of measurements considered on-body com-
munications channels operating at 5.8 GHz as found in body
area networks. The experiment was performed in the same
seminar room discussed above which was unoccupied except
for the test subject on whom the on-body nodes were placed.
For this scenario, to maximize coupling across the body
surface, the antennas were mounted normal to the torso of
an adult male of height 1.83 m and mass 74 kg. Node A
was positioned at the front central chest region at a height of
1.42 m while nodes B and E were placed on the rear of the
test subject at the central waist region at a height of 1.15 m
and the right back-pocket at a height of 0.92 m, respectively.
The measurements considered the case when the hypothetical
BAN user walked along a straight line within the large room,
covering a total distance of 9 m as shown in Fig. 6(b). For the
BAN scenario, a total of 19260 samples of the received signal
power were obtained and used for parameter estimation.
Figs. 8(a) and (b) show the empirical PDF of the signal
envelope for Bob and Eve, again compared to the κ-μ PDF
given in [26, eq. (11)]. Identical to the analysis of the D2D
measurements, the optimum window size was determined from
the raw channel data. In this case a smoothing window of
100 samples was used. Again, the κ-μ PDF was found to
provide an excellent fit to the empirical data for both Bob and
Eve. Interestingly for the BAN configuration considered here,
the estimated κ parameter of the eavesdropper’s channel was
greater than that of the main channel, while for the estimated
μ parameters, the converse situation was true (Table I).
Fig. 8(c) shows the probability of SPSC versus γ¯E with
selected values of γ¯M for the measured BAN channel. With
the main channel’s average SNR fixed at 10 dB, we observe
that increasing the average SNR of the eavesdropper’s chan-
nel from 5 dB to 10 dB causes the probability of SPSC
to significantly decrease from 82% to 50%. Moreover, to
ensure an SPSC level of at least 25% or 50%, we find that
the eavesdropper’s average SNR must not exceed approxi-
mately 13.7 dB and 10 dB, respectively. Fig. 8(d) shows the
SO P L versus γ¯E with selected values of γ¯M for the measured
BAN channel. With the main channel’s average SNR fixed
at 10 dB, we observe that if the average SNR of the eaves-
dropper is increased from 5 dB to 10 dB the SO P L rises
from 42% to 75%. Furthermore for this fading environment,
it is also seen that the average SNR of the eavesdropper must
not exceed 9.8 dB and 6.1 dB to ensure a secrecy reliability
level of at least 25% or 50%, respectively.
C. Peer to Peer Scenario
The third set of measurements considered peer-to-peer com-
munications channels operating at 5.8 GHz in an open office
environment located on the first floor of the ECIT building at
Queen’s University Belfast in the United Kingdom. The office
contained a number of chairs, metal storage spaces, doors
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Fig. 8. Empirical envelope PDF of (a) node B and (b) node E compared to the κ-μ PDF given in [26, eq. (11)]. (c) and (d) show the probability of
SPSC and SO P L (γth = 1.5 dB) versus γ¯E with selected values of γ¯M for BAN channel measurements.
Fig. 9. Empirical envelope PDF of (a) node B and (b) node E compared to the κ-μ PDF given in [26, eq. (11)]. (c) and (d) show the probability of
SPSC and SO P L (γth = 1.5 dB) versus γ¯E with selected values of γ¯M for P2P channel measurements.
and desks constructed from medium density fibreboard. These
desks were vertically separated by soft wooden partitions.
The experiment was performed with nodes A, B and E
positioned on different desks in the open office with people
seated at location’s P as indicated in Fig. 6(c). During the
measurement trial, two pedestrians initially stationary at points
X and Y, walked simultaneously covering a distance of 9 m
from their starting points, rotated clockwise and walked back
BHARGAV et al.: SECRECY CAPACITY ANALYSIS OVER κ–μ FADING CHANNELS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 3021
Fig. 10. Satellite view of measurement environment showing the position of nodes A, B and E for V2V scenario. The vehicle with node E remained parked
on the side of the road and was oriented such that it faced directly towards node A. Arrows indicate the front of the car.
to their initial positions. The pedestrian at point X was an adult
female of height 1.65 m and mass 53 kg while the pedestrian
at point Y was an adult male of height 1.72 m and mass 80 kg.
A total of 34464 samples of the received signal power were
obtained and used for parameter estimation.
Figs. 9(a) and (b) show the empirical PDF of the signal
envelope for Bob and Eve compared to the κ-μ PDF. An opti-
mum window size was determined from the raw channel data
and a smoothing window of 200 samples was used. It can
be seen that the κ-μ PDF provides a very good fit to the
measured data for both Bob and Eve. Figs. 9(c) and (d), show
the probability of SPSC and SO P L versus γ¯E with selected
values of γ¯M for the measured P2P channel, respectively. It can
be seen from these figures that the estimates for κM and κE are
much greater than 0, suggesting that a dominant component
exists for both. We also observe that the parameter estimates
for μM and μE are both greater than 1, suggesting that
multiple multipath clusters contribute to the signal received by
both Bob and Eve. Furthermore, the κ and μ values measured
for the P2P scenario were found to be much greater than the
fading parameters measured for all other applications.
As before, considering the average SNR of the main channel
to be equal to 10 dB in Fig. 9(c), we see that if the eaves-
dropper improves her average SNR from 5 dB to 10 dB, the
probability of SPSC reduces from 98% to 50%. This steep
decrease in P0 is due to the estimated κ parameter of the
eavesdropper’s channel being much larger than that of the
legitimate channel (see Table I). For the P2P application,
to ensure an SPSC level of at least 25% we find that the
eavesdropper’s average SNR must not exceed 12.8 dB. Like-
wise, to ensure an SPSC level of at least 50%, γ¯E must not
exceed 10 dB. For the SOP, an increase in Eve’s average SNR
from 5 dB to 10 dB causes the channel between Alice and Bob
to become increasingly susceptible to eavesdropping. Here,
the secrecy outage probability increased from 30% to 96%.
Furthermore, it can also be seen that the average SNR of the
eavesdropper must not exceed 7.5 dB and 6.2 dB to ensure
a secrecy reliability level of at least 25% or 50% for the
legitimate channel, respectively.
D. Vehicle-to-Vehicle Scenario
The fourth set of measurements considered vehicle-to-
vehicle communication channels operating at 5.8 GHz. The
experiments were conducted in a business district environ-
ment in the Titanic Quarter of Belfast, United Kingdom.
As shown in Fig. 10, the area consisted of a straight road with
a number of office buildings nearby. For this particular
scenario, nodes A, B and E were placed on the center of the
dash boards of three different vehicles; namely, a Vauxhall
(Opel in Europe) Zafira SRi, a Vauxhall Astra SRi and a
Hyundai Getz. The initial positions of the vehicles are shown
in Fig. 10. The measurements began when the vehicles that
contained nodes A and B started approaching one another at
a speed of 30mph. During these measurements the vehicle
containing node E remained parked (with the driver still seated
inside) on the side of the road as indicated in Fig. 10. It should
be noted that all of the channel measurements made in this
scenario were performed during off-peak traffic hours and
were subject to perturbations caused by the driver, movement
of the nearby pedestrians and other vehicular traffic. A total
of 56579 samples of the received signal power were obtained
and used for parameter estimation.
Figs. 11(a) and (b) show the empirical PDF of the signal
envelope for Bob and Eve compared to the κ-μ PDF. Similar
to the analysis of the D2D, P2P and BAN measurements,
the optimum window size was determined from the raw
channel data. The local mean for the V2V measurements was
calculated over 200 samples. From these figures we can see
that the PDF of the κ-μ fading model provides a very good
approximation to the V2V data. From Table I, it can be seen
that the estimates of κ for the main and the eavesdropper’s
channels are greater than 0 whilst the estimated μ parameters
are less than 1, suggesting that a dominant component exists
and that these channels suffer less from multipath caused by
scattering. We also observe that the estimated κ parameter
of the eavesdropper’s channel was greater than that of the
legitimate channel whilst the estimated μ parameter of the
main channel was only marginally greater than that of
the eavesdropper’s channel.
Fig. 11(c) depicts the probability of SPSC versus γ¯E with
selected values of γ¯M for the measured V2V channel. With
γ¯M = 10 dB, it is seen that if the eavesdropper’s average
SNR is increased from 5 dB to 10 dB, the probability of
SPSC is reduced from 86% to 48%. Furthermore, it can
also be seen that this decrease in the probability of SPSC is
higher than that experienced for the measured D2D and BAN
channels for the same improvement in the average SNR of
the eavesdropper’s channel. For this application, to ensure an
SPSC level of at least 25% or 50%, we find that the eaves-
dropper’s average SNR must not exceed 12.8 dB and 10 dB,
respectively. Equivalently, Fig. 11(d) depicts the probability of
SO P L versus γ¯E with selected values of γ¯M for the measured
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Fig. 11. Empirical envelope PDF of (a) node B and (b) node E compared to the κ-μ PDF given in [26, eq. (11)]. (c) and (d) show the probability of SPSC
and SO P L (γth = 1.5 dB) versus γ¯E with selected values of γ¯M for V2V channel measurements.
V2V channel. Again considering γ¯M = 10 dB, it is seen that if
Eve is able to increase her average SNR from 5 dB to 10 dB,
the secrecy outage probability is doubled. Since κE > κM ,
the legitimate channel becomes increasingly susceptible to
eavesdropping as γ¯E is increased. For the V2V application,
it is also seen that the average SNR of the eavesdropper must
not exceed 9 dB and 6.1 dB to ensure a secrecy reliability
level of at least 25% or 50% for the Alice-Bob channel,
respectively.
VII. CONCLUSION
Novel analytical and closed-form expressions for the
probability of SPSC and SOPL of the recently proposed
κ-μ fading model have been presented. Specifically, the ana-
lytical expressions have been derived for i.n.i.d. channel coef-
ficients without parameter restrictions. We have also arrived
at an exact closed form expression for the probability of
SPSC for integer values of μM and μE . Based on these
results we have provided a useful insight into the behavior of
SPSC and SOPL as a function of parameters {κM , μM , γ¯M }
and {κE , μE , γ¯E }. The analytical and closed form
expressions have been validated through reduction to known
special cases and Monte-Carlo simulations. As the κ-μ fading
model is a very general statistical model that includes many
well-known distributions, the new equations derived in this
paper will find use in characterizing the secrecy performance
of several different fading channels. Moreover, the results
presented here will also find immediate application in the
calculation of outage probability in wireless systems affected
by CCI and BN, and the calculation of outage probability in
interference-limited scenarios. Finally, we have illustrated the
utility of the new formulations by investigating the probability
of SPSC and SO P L based on real channel measurements
conducted for a diverse range of wireless applications such as
cellular device-to-device, peer-to-peer, vehicle-to-vehicle and
body centric fading channels. It is also worth highlighting that
all of the expressions presented in this paper can be easily
evaluated using functions available in mathematical software
packages such as Mathematica and Matlab.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF EQUATION (14)
From (13), we have
Pout (γth) = P
[
γM ≤ (1 + γth) (1 + γE ) − 1
]
=
∫ ∞
0
fγE (γE )
⎡
⎢⎣
(γth+γthγE+γE )∫
0
fγM (γM ) dγM
⎤
⎥⎦ dγE
=
∫ ∞
0
fγE (γE )
[
FγM (γth + γthγE + γE )
]
dγE .
(27)
Substituting (8) and (9) in (27) we obtain (14).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
An analytical expression for (16) can be derived by express-
ing the generalized Marcum Q-function and the modified
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Bessel function of the first kind according to [35, eq. (16)]
and [36] as follows:
Qm (a, b) =
∞∑
l=0
a2l
(
m + l, b22
)
l! (m + l) 2l e a22
(28)
Iv (x) =
∞∑
k=0
(
x
2
)v+2k
k! (v + k + 1) (29)
where (·) is the gamma function, (·, ·) is the incomplete
gamma function. By substituting (28) and (29) in (16)
SO P L (γth)
=
∞∫
0
β
μE −1
2
E
α
μE −1
2
E e
αE
γ
μE −1
2
E e
−βEγE
× IμE −1
(
2
√
βEαEγE
)
dγE −
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=0
(√
βEαE
)μE −1+2k
k!l!γ (d) γ (c) eαM
× β
μE −1
2
E
α
μE −1
2
E e
αE
∞∫
0
γ d−1E e
−βEγE  (c, βM (1 + γth) γE ) dγE
(30)
where a = 1/γ¯M , b = 1/γ¯E , c = μM + l, d = μE + k,
βM = (1 + κM )aμM , βE = (1 + κE )bμE , αM = κMμM and
αE = κEμE . Notably, the first integral in (30) is equivalent
to 1 and the second integral is identical to [32, eq. (6.455)]
given by
∫ ∞
0
xμ−1e−βx (v, αx) dx
= α
v (μ + v)
μ(α + β)μ+v
× 2 F1
(
1, μ + v;μ + 1; β
α + β
)
[Re (α + β) > 0, Re μ > 0, Re (μ + v) > 0] . (31)
Substituting these in (30) we obtain (17).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
From [37, eq. (2.5)], we have
Pμ,v (A, B; r) = A−μB−v
∫ ∞
0
xμ+1e−
(
x2+A2
2
)
Iμ (Ax) dx
×
∫ rx
0
yv+1e
−
(
y2+B2
2
)
Iv (By) dy. (32)
Using the definition of the Marcum Q-function given in (4)
in (32), we obtain
Pμ,v (A, B; r) = 1 − A−μ
∫ ∞
0
xμ+1e−
(
x2+A2
2
)
Iμ (Ax)
×Qv+1 (B, r x) dx . (33)
Now letting x =
√
2μE (1+κE )γE
γ¯E
and performing the necessary
transformation of variables we obtain
Pμ,v (A, B; r)
= 1 − A−μe− A
2
2
∫ ∞
0
2
μ
2
(
μE (1 + κE )
γ¯E
)μ
2 +1
× γE μ2 e
−μE (1+κE )γE
γ¯E Iμ
(
A
√
2μE (1 + κE ) γE
γ¯E
)
× Qv+1
(
B, r
√
2μE (1 + κE ) γE
γ¯E
)
dγE . (34)
Comparing (34) with (20) and with the appropriate variable
substitutions (see Proposition 3), we obtain
Pμ,v (A, B; r)
= 1 − μE (1 + κE )
μE +1
2
κE
μE −1
2 γ¯
μE +1
2
E e
μE κE
∫ ∞
0
γE
μE −1
2
× e
−μE (1+κE )γE
γ¯E IμE −1
(
2μE
√
κE (1 + κE ) γE
γ¯E
)
× QμM
(
√
2κMμM ,
√
2μM (1 + κM ) γE
γ¯M
)
dγE . (35)
Pμ,v (A, B; r) = 1 − P0. (36)
From [37, eq. (3.16)], we have
Pμ,v (A, B; r) = P0,0 (A, B; r) + ex p
(
− A
2r + B2r−1
2R
)
×
v∑
m=−μ
(
A
Br
)m
Im
(
AB
R
)
×
⎧
⎨
⎩
μ∑
k=1
(
v + k
k + m
)
r v−k+1 R−v−k−1
−
v∑
j=1
( j
m
)
r j−1 R− j−1
⎫
⎬
⎭. (37)
From [37, eq. (3.5)], we have
P0,0 (A, B; r) = Q
(
Ar√
1 + r2 ,
B√
1 + r2
)
−
(
1 + r2
)−1
× exp
[
− A
2r2 + B2
2
(
1 + r2)
]
I0
(
ABr
1 + r2
)
. (38)
Letting P´ = P0,0 (A, B; r) and combining (36), (37) and (38)
we obtain (22). Note that [37] uses lower-case symbols (a, b)
and we use upper-case symbols (A, B). This is because we
define a = 1γ¯M and b = 1γ¯E .
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